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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LEGISLATION DESIGNATING TIME AND MANNER OF
PAYMENT OF WAGES.-Not infrequently the legislatures of various states
have deemed it advisable to provide by law for the time and manner of
payment of wages of men engaged in certain designated employments; and
these laws have been the cause of considerable litigation. Their validity has
been challenged -mainly on the ground of deprivation of property without
due process of law and denial of the equal protection of fhe law, the con-
tention being that the refusal of the privilege of contracting for the manner
anti time of payment is a deprivation of liberty and property, and the classi-
fication of men in certain sorts of work as being subject to the provisions
of the statutes while others were not is a denial of the equal protection of
the law. The conclusions of the courts have not been entirely harmonious,
and while many of the decisions may be reconciled or explained on one
ground or another, chiefly the wording of the particular statutes involved,
not all of them may be disposed of in that way. Because of this lack of
harmony the decision of the New York Court of Appeals in New York Cent.
& H. R. R. Co. v. Williams, 92 N. E. 404, is of especial interest.
In that case the court considered the constitutionality of certain portions
of the New York labor law, the sections in controversy being in part as fol-
lows: "Sec. io. Cash Payment of Wages. Every manufacturing, mining,
quarrying, mercantile, railroad, street railway, canal, steamboat, telegraph
and telephone company, every express company, every corporation engaged
in harvesting and storing ice, and every water company, not municipal, and
every person, firm or corporation, engaged in or upon any public work for
the state or municipal corporation thereof, either as a contractor, or a sub-
contractor therewith, shall pay to each employ6 engaged in his, their or its
business the wages earned by such eroploy6 in cash. No such company, per-
son, firm or corporation shall lhereafter pay such employ6s in script, com-
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monly known as store orders." Consol. Laws, c. 31, § 10. "Sec. ii. When
Wages are to be Paid. * -* * But every person or corporation operating a
steam surface railroad shall, on or before the firstday of each month, pay
the employis -thereof the wages earned by them during the first half of the
preceding month ending with the fifteenth day thereof, and on or before the
fifteenth of each month pay the employ~s thereof the wages- earned by them
during the last half of the preceding calendar month." Consol. Laws, c. 31,
§ ii. By Section 12 of the same statute it is provided that if a corporation
shall fail to pay the wages of an employ6 as above provided'it shall forfeit
to the state fifty dollars for each such failure, to be recovered by the factory
inspector in his name of office in a civil action. The action was a suit in
equity against the factory inspector to restrain him from instituting any
proceeding against the plaintiff for the collection of penalties for violations
of the provisions above referred to. The court held that the statute requir-
ing railroads to pay their employ6s semi-monthly in cash was valid as an
amendment to their corporate charters.
The precise limits of the power of a state under the reserved power of
amendment to amend corporate chatters are uncertain. In CooK, CORPORA-
TIONS, § 5O, the author states that "It should be restricted to those amend-
ments only-in which the state has a public interest" "A power reserved to
the legislature to alter, amend, or repeal a charter authorizes it to make
any alteration or amendment of a charter granted subject to it which will
not defeat or substantially impair 'the object of the grant, or afiy -rights
vested under it, and which the legislature may deem necessary to secure
either that object or any public right. Commissioners of Inland Fisheries v.
Holyoke Water Power Co., lO4 Mass. 446, 451; Holyoke Co. 'V. Lyman, x5
Wall. 500, 522." Close v. Glenwood Cemetery, io7 U. S. 466, 476. This doc-
trine reaffirmed in New York & New England R. R. Co. v. Bristol, i51 U. S.
556, and Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 .U. S. 45. The New York legislature
required that a certain street railroad company then in existence should pay
to the city one per cent of its gross receipts instead of a license fee of fifty
dollars per car as required theretofore. In Mayor, etc. v. Twenty-third St.
R. Co., 113 N. Y. 311, this legislation was upheld as an amendment of the
company's charter. In the opinion of the court, Judge EARr, said: "It is
difficult to put precise limits upon the power of the legislature thus reserved
over corporations created by it or under its authority. Under its reserved
power it cannot deprive a corporation of its property, or interfere with, or
annul its contracts with third persons. (People v. O'Brien, xx N. Y. x).
gut it may take away its franchise to be a corporation, and may regulate the
exercise of its corporate powers. As it has tle power utterly to deprive the
corporation of its franchise to be a corporation, it may prescribe the condi-
tions and terms upon which it may live and exercise such franchise. It may
enlarge or limit its powers, and it may increase or limit its burdens. It is
sometimes said that the alteration under such reserved power must, how-
ever, be reasonable, and it must always be legislative in its character, and
consistent with the scope and objects" of the corporation as it was originally
constituted." It has been stated that under the reserved power the legisla-
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ture has only that right to amend the charter which it would have had in
case the Dartmouth College case had decided that the federal constitution
did not apply to corporate charters. Garey v. St. Joe Mining Co., 32 Utah
497, 511, 91 Pac. 369. It was-because of the decision in the Dartmouth Col-
lege case that the states have -reserved the power of amendment. See further
on this question as to the scope of the power of amendment, CooK, CORPoRA-
TIONS, Ed. 6, § 5oi, wherein the cases are collected, and Fenner v. Chicago
C. Ry. Co., 92 N. E. 643 (Illinois, igio). And a statute may operate as an
amendment of the charter of a corporation even though such statute does
not purport expressly to amend such charter. Pratt Institute v. City of New
York, 183 N. Y. 151, 75 N. E. iiig; People ex rel. Cooper Union v. Gass, i9o
N. Y. 323, 83 N. E.'64, 123 Am. St. Rep. 549; Berea College v. Kentucky,
supra; City of Roxbury v. Boston & Providence Railroad Corporation, 6
Cush. 424; Bangor, 0. & M. R. R. Co. v. Smith, 47 Me. 34. Contra: State
v. Haun, 6i Kan. 146, 59 Pac. 340, 47 L. R. A. 369. -See also, Bedford Quar-
ries v. Bough, 168 Ind. 671, 8o N. E. 529.
Legislation similar in its general nature to that upheld in the principal
case has been held valid as being within the reserved power of amendment
in Lawrence v. Rutland R. R., 8o Vt. 37o, 67 Atl. 1091, 15 L. R. A. [N. S.]
350; Shaffer & Munn v. Union Mining Co., 55 Md. 74; State v. Brown & S.
Mfg. Co., 18 R. J. i6, 17 L. R. A. 856; St. Louis, Iron Mountain & St. P.
Ry. Co. v. Paul, 173 U. S. 404, 19 Sup. Ct. 419, 43 L. Ed. 746. See also Opin-
ion of Justices, 163 Mass. 589, 40 N. E. 713, 28 L. R. A. 344. In the Ver-
mont case and Paul case stress was laid on the fact that in railroad corpor-
ations by which in both cases the constitutionality of the statutes was ques-
tioned the public had an interest, and the supreme court of Vermont ex-
plained the conclusions of some of the courts which had held like legisla-
tion invalid on the basis that in those cases there were considered amend-
ments to charters of corporations in which there was no public interest. In
Leep v. Railway Co., 58 Ark. 407, the supreme court of Arkansas had under
consideration the same statute involved in the Paul case, supra, and after
observing that railroads are common carriers, and so charged with a public
trust, said: "If the legislature, in its wisdom, 'seeing that their employ~s
are and will be dependent on their labor for a livelihood, and unable to
work on a credit, should find that better servants and service could be se-
cured by the prompt payment of their wages on the termination of their
employment, and that the purpose of their creation would be more nearly
accomplished, it might require them to pay for the labor of their employ~s
when the same is fully performed, at the end of their employment. If it be
true that.in doing so it would interfere with contracts which are purely and
exclusively private, and thereby limit their right to contract with individuals,
it would nevertheless, under such circumstances, have the right to do so
under the reserved power to amend." In this case the Arkansas court held
the statute unconstitutional so far as it applied to employers not corpora-
tions.. On this same point Chief Justice FurLR; in the Paul case, said: "In
view of the fact that these corporations were clothed with a public trust,
and discharged duties of public consequence, affecting the commuRity at
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large, the supreme court held the regulation, as promoting the public interest
in the protection of employds to the limited -extent stated, to be properly
within the power to amend reserved under the state constitution. Inasmuch
as the right to contract is not absolute, but may be subjected to the restraints
demanded by the safety and welfare of the State, we do not think that
conclusion in its application to the power t6 amend can be disputed on the
ground of infraction of tho Fourteenth Amendment. Orient Ins. Co. v.
Daggs, 172 U. S. 557; Holden v. Hardy, x69 U. S. 366; St. Louis & San
Francisco Ry. v. Matthews, 165 U. S. i."
On the other hand, in Toledo, St. L. & W. R. Co. v. Long, i6g Ind. 3.6,
82 N. E. 757, a statute requiring every company, corporation, or association
doing business in the state to pay its employis who are engaged in man-
ual or mechanical labor, at least once a month, and -which provided for a
penalty for non-compliance together with attorney's fees, was held violative
of the fourteenth amendment as imposing on companies, corporations, and
associations burdens not imposed on individuals. In the following cases*
statutes regulating manner, or time of payment of wages were held invalid:
State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va. i79, 6 L. R. A. 621; Godcharles v. Wigeman,
113 Pa. St. 431; Millett v. People, 117 Ill. 294; State v. Han, 6I Kan. 146;
State v. Loomis, 115 Mo. 3o7, 21 L. R. A. 789; Braceville Coal Co. v. People,
147 Ill. 66, 22 L. R. A. 34o; Slocum v. Bear Valley Irr. Co., 122 Cal. 555, 55
Pac. 4o3, 68 Am. St. Rep. 68; Johnson v. Goodyear Mining Co., 127 Cal. 4, 59
Pac. 304, 47 L. R. A. 338, 78 Am. St. Rep. 17. In but very few of these cases
was the question as to the reserved power to amend raised, and most of the
cases went off on the ground of improper classification. In the California cases
the -statutes held invalid provided for a lien on the property of the corporation
in case of failure to pay wages as provided, and the decisions seem to have
been placed largely, on that point. However in Skinner v. Garnett Gold Min.
Co., 96 Fed. 735, the federal court upheld the statute considered in the later
California case above" cited.
In Braceville Coal Co. v. People, supra, in which a statute requiring cor-
porations engaged in certain designated businesses to pay their employgs
weekly was held unconstitutional on the ground of impioper classification,
the court observed that the restriction upon the corporation was an abridg-
ment of the right of the eniploy~s to contract. In Lawrence v. Rutland R.
Co. supra, this point was answered by the court as follows: "But the re-
striction of their (the employ~s) rights is not direct, but results from the re-
striction of the defendant's rights; and, as that restriction is good as to the
defendant, the rights of its employgs are not thereby infringed, for they have
no right to demand greater liberty for the defendant in order that their
liberty may be enlarged."
It is impossible to tell just how much the decision of the court in the
principal case was based upon the public nature of the business of railroad
corporations. It should be noted that section io of the act under consider-
ation required all corporations named to pay their employ~s in cash,--and
some of the corporations named are not engaged in any business of a public
nature. By section ii it is first provided that "Every corporation * * * shall
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pay weekly to each employd," following which is the provision regarding
steam surface railroads above quoted. In Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison,
183 U. S. 13, 22 Sup. Ct. i, 43 L. Ed. 55, the Supreme Court upheld a Ten-
nessee statute requiring the redemption of store orders issued in payment of
wages in lawful money at their face value as being within the police power.
What the conclusion of the court in the principal case would .have been had
the question of the constitutionality of the statute been raised by a cor-
poration not engaged in a business of a public nature may perhaps be
-not entirely certain. It should be noted also that the court did not pass
upoft the constitutionality of the statute as applied to employers other than
railroad corporations. P. W. A.
HeinOnline  -- 9 Mich. L. Rev. 146 1910-1911
